As the recent delays with the Airbus A380 demonstrate – mainly due, it has been reported, to "the definition, manufacturing and installation of electrical systems and resulting harnesses" – the power generation business is not alone when it comes to establishing overoptimistic schedules and then failing to achieve them – and finding, as always, that the devil resides in the detail.
But the delays at TVO's Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) EPR pressurised water reactor project in Finland – originally hailed as a major breakthrough for the nuclear business and a key step towards revival of nuclear energy when the order was placed – are, to say the least, embarrassing.
The delays have come to public prominence just when nuclear power is back on the agenda with a vengeance (to borrow a phrase from British prime minister Tony Blair) in many countries, thanks to the combined effects of high and volatile gas prices, energy security worries and climate change concerns.
Among recent significant positive developments in the nuclear arena has been the government of Ontario's directive to Ontario Power Generation that it should start the work needed for an environmental assessment of the building of new nuclear units at existing sites (along with feasibility studies on refurbishing units at Pickering and Darlington).
Over the border in the USA there are now proposals for about 20 reactors receiving serious consideration, mainly ESBWRs and AP1000s, but also including an EPR project (UniStar) and two 1350 MWe ABWRS to be sited at the existing South Texas Project site. The latter were the subject of a letter of intent filed by NRG with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 19 June.
In view of the interest in nuclear power being shown in the USA it is also perhaps no wonder that MHI has dusted down its APWR design, now rated at 1700 MWe, with an efficncy of 39%, and is planning to submit a certification application to the NRC.
Looking to the longer term the US Department of Energy has been seeking expressions of interest from industry teams looking to participate in the conceptual design of the Next Generation Nuclear Plant, envisaged to be a very high temperature gas cooled reactor.
In the Ukraine the EBRD has announced that EBRD and Euratom loans for safety upgrade of the Khemelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 1000 MWe PWRs can finally be disbursed now that the last outstanding loan condition (setting up of a decommissioning fund) has been met.
In the UK the just published energy review (see this month's news) says that "the government believes that nuclear has a role to play in the future UK generating mix alongside other low carbon generating options." The review recognises that there is scope for speeding up the licensing process (by, for example, pre-licensing of designs) and streamlining planning procedures, including, it must be hoped, avoidance of ridiculously drawn out public inquiries of dubious value, as exemplified by Sizewell B.
Even the G8 communique from St Petersburg touches on nuclear power and mentions some of its benefits.
With this apparent outpouring of goodwill, the nuclear industry, which has so often bemoaned its lack of support, particularly an unwillingness of certain politicians and governments to speak out in favour, must deliver, and be seen to be
delivering, to time and to budget (not something it has always been good at in the past). Against this background it is a great shame that such a high profile project as OL3 has run into difficulties, and is now about a year behind schedule, with commissioning expected to be completed during the second quarter of 2010.
OL3 is of course a very ambitious piece of engineering, as is A380. The latter is nothing less than the largest passenger plane ever flown (able to carry 840 people), while, at 1600 MWe, OL3 is the biggest nuclear reactor ever built, to say nothing of the fact that the project also encompasses the small matter of designing and building the world's largest ever steam turbine.
With first of a kind cutting edge projects of mind boggling complexity the surprise is perhaps not that they are behind their schedules but that they ever get anywhere near them.
However, the OL3 EPR was sold on the basis that it was evolutionary not revolutionary. Unpleasant surprises are not what the Finnish pulp and paper makers and other hard-nosed industrialists – the shareholders in purchasing utility TVO – were expecting when they signed up to the project. Indeed, a priority was to opt for proven technology with minimal risks. Nevertheless, building the world's first EPR to stringent Finnish safety requirements – including a detailed investigation of the ability of the containment to withstand the impact of a commercial aircraft with full tanks fuel – was never going to be easy.
TVO is understandably fond of emphasising that the contract with nuclear supplier Areva is turn-key and fixed price, presumably with onerous penalty clauses for late delivery.
The OL3 EPR may be evolutionary, but as an Areva press release of 12 July points out, "it includes numerous innovative features" and "considering the scale of this first-of-a-kind project, the problems that have led to the delays are nothing unusual."
Among the issues mentioned (by both Areva and TVO): detailed design has simply taken longer than was estimated; sub-contractors have taken longer than anticipated to get up to speed with the enhanced performance levels demanded by "the new generation of nuclear power plants"; and problems with concrete production at the on-site batching plant (requiring explanation of why certain batches had very slightly too high a water content).
Reassuringly, according to a just published report on the project's safety culture by the Finnish regulator STUK, the "major problems involve project management ... but not nuclear safety." However STUK seems to be critical of everyone concerned (including, somewhat remarkably, itself), and is particularly scathing about the vendor's performance. It says, for example, that the power plant vendor has selected subcontractors with no prior nuclear experience and given them insufficient guidance, and has not familiarised itself enough with Finnish practices. STUK recommends, among other things, that the vendor "should see to it that all design documents it submits ... are, the first time around, of the extent and quality that no considerable amendments or changes are required afterwards."
If nuclear power is to have any hope of enjoying a substantial revival the lessons of Olkiluoto must be fully analysed and taken on board. A good starting point for those contemplating future projects would be this new STUK report on OL3.
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